The first half of this paper argues that Brazilian political parties are uniquely underdeveloped. In contrast to the situation in the other more developed countries of Latin America, Brazilian parties have appeared and disappeared with remarkable frequency. The catch-all parties have limited autonomy with respect to the state, and parties have comparatively weak penetration in civil society. In these parties, the attachment of politicians to their parties is exceptionally weak. Politicians often change parties, and party discipline and cohesion in congress are very low. The second half of the paper examines some systemic causes of party underdevelopment. Because of the country's extreme social and economic inequalities, the masses do not participate effectively in the political system, and most of the electorate is relatively indifferent to issues and parties. The state bureaucracy, rather than parties and the legislature, has been the major focal point of Brazilian politics; this situation is inimical to party development. In response to the complex demands created by the combination of a presidential system, a fragmented multiparty system, and federalism, presidents have consistently attempted to undermine parties. Finally, Brazilian politicians have attempted to prevent more effective parties from emerging, believing that party loyalty and more disciplined parties would limit their ability to attend to their clienteles.
people look to politicians for clientelistic mediations that make viable the "parties of the state" that still dominate the political scene. Second, the consolidation of a state with massive intervention and regulatory powers means that the bureaucracy, rather than representative institutions, has the decisive weight in the political system. The major parties remain dependent on the state.
Third, the combination of presidentialism and a fractionalized multiparty system makes party building difficult. Finally, the Brazilian political class has consciously opted for weak parties. This option is reflected and institutionalized in party organization and in electoral legislation.
Assessing Party Development, 1979-1989
Compared to parties in the other more developed countries of Latin America, and even in some countries that are less developed than Brazil, Brazilian parties stand out for their short duration. Table 1 below provides evidence for this point, as well as underscoring the extreme fluidity of the party system since the last congressional elections in November 1986. The discontinuity in parties from the previous democratic Table 2 for a glossary of party initials and party names.) The abrupt changes in party systems are equally notable. Since parties first emerged in the 1830s, Brazil has had seven distinct party systems (1830s until 1889, 1890s until 1930, 1930-1937, 1945-1965, 1966-1979, 1979-1984, 1984-present) , with sharp changes in the number of electorally significant parties from one system to the next.
TABLE 2 __________________________________________________________________

Glossary of Party Initials and Party Names __________________________________________________________________
PMDB
Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement. The PMDB's precursor, the MDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement) was created in 1966 as the official party of opposition to the military regime. It was renamed the PMDB in 1978. Since its inception, the PMDB has been an extremely heterogeneous party, but its hegemonic group is centrist, although many conservatives have flocked to the party in recent years. In addressing these questions, it is important to avoid positing a specific kind of party or party system as necessary for the effective functioning of democracy. It would be misleading to imagine that democracy requires highly disciplined and programmatic parties, because of the wellknown counterexamples (US, Canada, Costa Rica). The emergence of party systems dominated by "strong" (i.e., disciplined and programmatic) parties of the type described by Michels and
PFL
Duverger is unlikely under current historical conditions. 6 This point is important because, as Reis has argued, 7 sometimes the problem of Brazilian parties is incorrectly identified as a lack of clear ideological positions, with the (at least once) ideological party systems of Western Europe serving as an implicit reference point.
Even from a minimalist perspective, however, the difficulties of Brazilian party development in the post-1979 period are notable. Many of the clichés about parties in Latin America-clientelistic, dependent on the state, little impact in formulating public policy-are partially misleading when applied to the other more developed countries of the region, but they are generally true in the Brazilian case. The following pages examine this ongoing fragility of parties by analyzing three crucial relationships that disaggregate the parties' functions in the political system: party and state; party and civil society; and party and politicians, especially congressional representatives. 8
Let us first consider the relationship between parties and the state. Those in power continue to use the state apparatus to form-and deform-political parties. For most analysts, parties represent civil society, but the Brazilian reality is often otherwise. Through a variety of mechanisms the state continues to interfere with and even control a broad range of party processes: party affiliation, voting behavior of parliamentary representatives, party sympathies and affiliations of mayors and deputies. By using the state apparatus to ensure or deny access to jobs, resources, promotions, and favors, state leaders (even when they are originally recruited from political parties) control the political parties that support the government. To some extent this is true in many democracies, but the magnitude of the problem in Brazil is exceptional.
Party membership is often stimulated and even coerced by the state apparatus as a way of strengthening the position of those who control the state. In exchange for joining the party in power, poor people win vouchers for milk and promises that they will get on a list for public housing. Politicians provide jobs to community organizers who deliver enough party members.
People may even be paid in subterfuge ways from state resources in order to secure party affiliations, and they may be threatened with losing their jobs if they do not deliver. Obtaining a certain number of party affiliations may win an individual a promotion within the bureaucracy.
Community groups can win sewer lines, electricity, pavement for the streets in the neighborhood, or other services if they deliver enough signatures for the party.
The use of state favors to promote party membership is an important tool in winning internal party control. Local party conventions are restricted to members of the party; whichever individual or faction can get the most people to the party conventions wins control of the local party. Whoever controls the party at the local level will be able to win the nomination for mayor-a decisive post because of local patronage possibilities. More important, local party conventions determine whom the delegates to the state convention will be. The state delegates, in turn, exercise the decisive voice in determining candidacies for governor, vice-governor, senators, and federal and state deputies, as well as deciding the composition of the state directorate and executive committee. The state delegates also vote to determine the national delegates, who elect the National Directorate and candidates for Vice-President and President.
Indicative of how effective the use of the state apparatus can be in securing control of the major parties is the fact that after the May 1988 conventions, all 22 PMDB governors controlled the party in their states. This control cannot be attributed to their popularity among the electorate because most of the governors had terrible reviews in public opinion surveys. In many states, widespread use of the state apparatus to obtain control of the party occasioned the departure of some of the party's most renowned figures, who claimed that it was impossible to fight back against the disloyal competition of the state machinery.
Among the more developed countries of Latin America, Brazil also stands out for the degree to which the state manipulates resources to influence the party affiliations and voting behavior of politicians. The survival of most politicians depends on their ability to deliver goods to the regions they represent. Mayors, governors, state secretaries, ministers, heads of governmental agencies and firms, and presidents use this fact to pressure politicians into supporting their line, and in some cases even into changing parties. Access to state favors lubricates many changes of heart. An egregious case of using the state machinery to purchase support occurred during the Sarney government. Sarney built his coalition not through party politics, but through extensive repartition of the state apparatus. Many politicians need no such pressure; they actively seek to flock to join the government party, regardless of what it is. Thus, a two way process draws legislators to support executives: the latter use sticks and carrots, the former are drawn to those who hold power.
The use of state resources is so decisive in party processes-both internal struggles and competition among parties-that we can speak of parties of the state. By this I mean that Brazilian parties are formed by the state as much as they are by civil society, and that they represent interests in the state as much as they represent civil society. 9 Despite the sharp differences in the party systems, the catch-all Brazilian parties resemble the Mexican PRI in their symbiotic relationship with the state. Nowhere else among the more developed countries of Latin America does the state play such a decisive role in party formation.
Thus, it is not just that parties were formed by the state, as Souza compellingly shows. 10
Decisive party processes-joining the parties, becoming delegates, determining which factions of the parties are dominant, voting in congress, and voting for representatives among the general population-are still greatly influenced by the state apparatus. This state influence over party processes has deleterious effects on party building. It has undermined parties as agents of political decision making in congress; support is bought and sold, rather than determined along party lines. Such practices have contributed to a depoliticization among the population, both by creating a negative view of politicians and by generating pessimism regarding the prospects for political change. It has reduced major parties to agents of the state, agents that distribute state resources in exchange for political compliance.
The major parties' lack of autonomy vis-à-vis the state is also apparent in the parties' weak influence in formulating programs and policies. Even if one agrees with Epstein, 11 as I do, that the importance of the programmatic and decision making functions of political parties is often overstated, the catch-all Brazilian parties are singularly anemic. None of the major parties wrote programs for the 1986 elections or even for the constitutional assembly, precisely the kind of event that usually occasions party programs and internal programmatic debates. The PMDB has not rewritten its party program since 1981, when it was an opposition party in a authoritarian regime, and when social democrats had hegemony within the party. Since then, it has become the largest party in a period of civilian government; more conservative politicians now dominate the party; and yet the party has not bothered to revise its program.
Perhaps more revealing than the parties' lack of concern with updating programs is their limited influence in formulating policies. The influence of parties in the decision making process is generally limited to the fact that politicians name a wide range of bureaucrats and policy makers.
Given the size of the bureaucracy and the inordinate number of patronage positions, this kind of influence is significant. The problem is that the nominations are almost always individually determined rather than made by the party. In fact, what is occurring is a private appropriation of the state apparatus rather than an increase in parties' influence in the decision making process. I interviewed several top level members of the various economic teams of the New Republic, as the post-1985 regime is commonly known. They almost all reported that no politicians debate policy matters with them, but that countless had come to request personal favors for themselves or for friends and relatives. One dissented slightly from this affirmation and noted that several politicians had come to discuss interest rates-but these politicians were either personally in debt or were supported by entrepreneurs who were. In brief, most politicians do not even attempt to affect macro decisions within the bureaucracy except through appointing friends and relatives to policy making positions. 12
There is also evidence that parties have comparatively weak penetration in civil society.
By international standards, levels of party identification in Brazil are very low. Paulo, recorded how representatives voted. I excluded two issues on which all of the major parties came to a prior agreement; in these cases, there were no more than a couple dozen dissenting votes.
As Table 6 shows, only two of the six parties that had at least 2% of the representatives in the constitutional congress were minimally cohesive. With the rare exception of an occasional abstention, the PT demonstrated remarkable cohesion, and the PDT also manifested considerable internal cohesion. The other parties were highly divided on the most important issues, as is reflected in the Rice Index of party cohesion, shown in the bottom row of Table 6. On most controversial issues, the PFL leadership was in the minority within the party, and a large fraction of the PMDB also voted against the leadership. Rather than parties, supraparty fronts dominated the constitutional congress. The PDS, the PTB, most of the PFL, about half of the PMDB, and some minor parties formed the conservative "Centrão," while the PT, PDT, the other half of the PMDB, and some minor parties formed the "Bloco Progressista." This formation of supraparty blocks was particularly noteworthy in the constitutional convention of 1987-88, but it is nothing new Organizationally, the large parties in Brazil are fragile. Party organs such as the Executive
Committee have fairly broad powers on paper, but in practice meet rarely and decide even less.
The situation in some European countries, in which representatives have limited autonomy vis-à-vis their parties and can even lose their mandates for failing to follow the party line, is anathema among the large Brazilian parties. This situation further undermines the significance of party platforms since the representatives have no obligation to follow the platform. It could be countered that this situation is also true in the U.S., and that U.S. parties have, on balance, served
American democracy rather well. But the lack of party cohesion in congress is notably more pronounced in Brazil than in the U.S., and one could logically suppose that a multiparty system would offer more, not less, cohesive parties.
Parties have few financial resources and few party volunteers. They have comparatively little control over who becomes a member, how politicians vote, what they do, and who gets elected. Brazilian parties are singularly loose organizations, designed to permit politicians to operate in a free wheeling fashion. The major parties lack cohesion; local disputes between political bosses, rather than ideological or political questions, frequently determine party affiliation.
All of these points are true not only with respect to the "strong" parties of most European democracies, but also to the loosely organized agglomerations of many Latin American nations.
This battery of information about the functions of parties in the Brazilian political system could be expanded, but this should suffice to establish the main contours. The significance of any one of these measures as an indicator of party fragility could be questioned, but collectively, I
think they provide a compelling portrait. Brazilian parties continue to have limited autonomy vis-à-vis the states, weak roots in civil society, and few controls over their representatives. 21
Causes of Party Underdevelopment
Many observers would agree with these broad characterizations of the fragility of Brazilian catch-all parties, although some disagree. What is more controversial and less obvious are the causes of party underdevelopment. In what follows, I address this issue, focusing specifically on the post-1979 period and prospects for the future.
The discussion focuses on several "structural" features of the political system that have In Table 7 below, Classes A and B are medium and high income groups, and classes D and E are the lowest income groups. A vast segment of the population votes according to extremely diffuse images or for personal favors. This characteristic of the electorate limits the viability of parties with a sharp ideological profile that campaign largely along issues. 25 The population is receptive to individualistic and populistic campaigns; these predilections in turn favor non-ideological, populist parties. The major political mediations with the popular classes take place through individual politicians and state agencies. Most of the electorate is indifferent not only to issues, but also to parties. The party affiliation of politicians may be important in enabling them to gain access to the state agencies, but it is generally unimportant both to the clientele and the patron.
The counterpart to the fantastic social inequalities is the extraordinary heterogeneity of the society. This heterogeneity is clearest in contrasting the wealthy and poor poles of the society, but it is also apparent within social classes. The working class, for example, is marked by a vast heterogeneity that helps explain the sharp divisions within the labor movement. These divisions make it difficult if not impossible for a political party to serve as the partisan channel of the working class. 26 The European situation, in which socialist, labor, or social-democratic parties served as the electoral expressions of the working class movement, is almost impossible given such intra-class heterogeneity.
The State and Party Development
In her pioneer book on the state and political parties in Brazil, Campello de Souza argued that the state has exercised a decisive impact on party formation. Criticizing those who had seen the fragility of Brazilian parties as resulting from the nature of the country's political leaders, she argues that the problem derives above all from the relationship between parties and the state.
She states her main argument succinctly: "The existence of a centralized state structure before the emergence of a party system constitutes, in itself, a difficulty for the institutionalization of the party system and a stimulus to clientelistic politics. From the vantage point of "spaces" occupied in the political system, the expansion of the state apparatus during the military regime creates renewed barriers to party development. More so than the legislature, the bureaucracy constitutes to be the focal point of most political action. 30
Omissive in the areas of welfare, health, and education for the masses, the Brazilian state is omnipresent in a vast array of economic and regulatory areas. This situation is inimical to party building since it relegates parties and congress to a dispenser of patronage.
Some of this problem can be addressed by strengthening the legislative branch, a process that the new constitution, promulgated in September 1988, promises to facilitate. The new constitution will considerably expand the legislature's de jure authority, hence may stimulate the parties' influence in decision making. But optimism about the effect of enhancing congressional authority in decision making may be unwarranted.
This is so first and foremost because of the irresponsible character of much of the Brazilian political class. On the whole, it is a political class known for corruption and clientelism, and legislative responsibilities are often not a top priority. Clientelism has a legitimate place in politics, but in Brazil clientelistic activities have predominated at the expense of legislative functions. Even in the constitutional congress, major issues were often debated in cavalier fashion. Many politicians had a poor grasp of the issues, and the quality of debates was usually dismal.
Early this century Weber persuasively argued that where professional politicians do not have serious responsibilities in the political system, they are likely to turn to less responsible activities to compensate for their lack of real power. 31 This observation is apposite in the Brazilian case. To survive during the military period, politicians who supported the government were virtually obliged to make clientelism and patronage their primary focus. Even with the high turnover rates that characterize Brazilian congressional elections, many of these politicians have survived and thrived under democratic politics. The prevalence of this kind of politician creates obstacles to efforts to give more authority to parties and the political class. Enhancing congressional authority is necessary in view of the extreme enervation of the legislature's role during military rule, but in the short run one cannot assume that the political class will make good use of its new powers.
The other compelling reason to avoid excessive optimism about greater congressional authority is the likelihood that congress will become much more effective in blocking presidential initiatives, but without acquiring the capacity to initiate policy measures. Interactions between the executive and congress are likely to be quite difficult given several features of the Brazilian political system: a fragmented multiparty system, a presidential system of government, and federalism. A bicameral congress reinforces the overall proclivity towards a political system predicated more upon checks and balances than upon effective or quick processing of major decisions. But conversely, the multiple crises facing a country that is self-destructing with alarming speed favor technocratic decision making within the executive branch of government.
Add to this the enormous power of the state bureaucracy and there are reasons to believe that the recent constitutional changes may not dramatically alter the relationship between parties and the state.
In short, in view of the massive powers of the state apparatus, strengthening the legislature may be more difficult than upgrading its formal powers. Finding a means of democratizing other state structures is also essential. 32 Furthermore, it is essential to balance strengthening the legislature with maintaining a fluid, agile decision process so that Brazil can effectively confront the multiple, agonizing crises that beset the country.
The political class has been acutely aware of the overshadowing of the legislature by the bureaucracy and has responded by expanding its influence within the bureaucracy. This "solution," however, amounts to a private appropriation of the state apparatus, and has done nothing to further party building. Furthermore, this solution has, in many cases, had deleterious consequences upon the efficacy of the state apparatus. Political criteria have reigned supreme;
with some important exceptions, considerations of efficiency, rationality, and justice have been neglected. In view of the enormous importance of the state apparatus as an engine of economic development in the last half century, the consequences of this neglect are grave.
The problem of party building in a society in which there is such a profound gap between the development of civil society and of the state is complex. Some of the obvious solutions, such as granting more power to congress, turn out to be more problematic than one assumes. The lengthy history of weak representative institutions works against efforts to create them today. This does not imply some kind of historical determinism, but it does call attention to the importance of historical sequences and specifically to the difficulties created by late party development.
Presidentialism, the Multiparty System, and Party Development
In comparative perspective there is nothing unusual about authoritarian regimes taking measures against political parties. What is more unusual in the Brazilian case is the anti-party sentiments and actions of presidents in democratic periods The anti-party actions of Brazilian presidents have been so common that it is important to ask whether there might not be some systemic cause, rather than individual idiosyncrasies and/or authoritarian proclivities of the various people who have occupied this position. In the period since 1945, part of the problem has stemmed from the combination of a fractionalized multiparty system and presidentialism.
Under the best of circumstances, presidential systems are less propitious to party building than parliamentary systems. This is so for four primary reasons. In the first place, parliamentary systems seem generally more conducive to stable democracy than presidential systems. 33
Continuity of the democratic process is in itself a powerful stimulus to party development because it facilitates the sedimentation of identities and practices that make parties a central axis of political life.
Second, because they are elected through a direct popular vote or an electoral college in turn dependent on the popular vote, presidents have an independent base of power. 34 In the age of the mass electronic media, presidents can make direct appeals to the population, thereby increasing their autonomy vis-à-vis the parties. Presidents cannot govern effectively when they consistently face a hostile majority in congress, but they can implement some important measures despite broad congressional opposition, thereby going above the parties. In parliamentary systems, the prime minister generally has less autonomy with respect to the parties. Especially in a parliamentary system where a multiparty coalition is ruling, his/her very position directly depends on the support of the parties. Implementing major policy decisions without the support of the parties is difficult in most decision areas.
Third, as Epstein persuasively argued, parliamentary systems have a strong incentive for cohesive-though not necessarily ideological-parties.
The individual legislators of a governing (or potentially governing) party have an entirely rational motivation for cohesion in a parliamentary system that they do not have under the separation of power. Each parliamentary vote on an important policy involves the question of whether the M.P. wants a cabinet of his party or of the opposition… He knows that his own electoral fortunes would likely suffer with his party's if the party shows itself so uncohesive as to fail to maintain its leadership in office… No such incentive operates with sufficient force to impel American congressmen, under the separation of powers, to be so cohesive. A congressman is able to vote differently from his party leadership, … and he does not hurt his party in any way that is politically meaningful to him. 35
Finally, party programs are often more important in parliamentary systems than in presidential systems. Everywhere, policy makers usually have considerable autonomy with respect to party programs, but in presidential systems, this autonomy is especially pronounced. In presidential systems, programs have symbolic importance, but usually have little impact on the policy making process. Personality assumes greater weight and issues usually have slightly less.
The combination of a presidential regime and a multiparty system is especially unconducive to party building and to democratic stability. In a multiparty presidential system, governing with the parties is particularly difficult, for the president rarely has a majority in congress.
Presidentialism is based on the notion of a balance of independent powers. Where the executive power is constantly thwarted by a hostile legislature, political stability is easily undermined, especially in less established democracies. And presidents will generally encounter more problems in creating a stable majority in a multiparty system than in a two-party system. In a multiparty system, it is difficult for a president to rely on parties as a basis for congressional action and policy implementation because there are few institutionalized mechanisms that establish fluid negotiations among the parties and between them and the executive. This problem does not exist in the same way in a multiparty parliamentary system because the parties negotiate and themselves determine the composition of the executive.
This combination of presidentialism and a multiparty system is further complicated by the The desire to create effective parties is not sufficient for such parties to emerge, but it is indispensable. Brazilian politicians have attempted to prevent more effective parties from emerging, believing that party loyalty and more disciplined parties would limit their ability to attend to their clienteles. With loosely organized parties, politicians are freer to attend to their own clienteles, without being bound to programmatic concerns or organizational commitments. At least since 1930, they have intentionally maximized their autonomy vis-à-vis their parties.
Politicians have helped create a political system in which they can deal in more or less independent ways, free of the fetters that disciplined parties would imply.
The anti-party predilection of politicians has been institutionalized in the ways parties are organized and in electoral legislation, ensuring that there is a strong self-perpetuating anti-party Most analyses of electoral systems have focused on the political consequences of electoral laws. This problem is important, to be sure, but exclusive concern with this side of the issue can be misleading. The political roots of electoral laws, i.e., the reason why politicians choose some laws rather than others, are as important as their political consequences. 43
In addition to representing interests, politicians have interests of their own. To further these interests, politicians tend to favor some kinds of electoral arrangements over others. The reason is that electoral arrangements are not neutral. They discriminate against some groups and politicians while favoring others. Electoral systems and electoral reforms may not produce the results they are intended to when they are drawn up. Almost always, however, they are intended to help, or at least to not hinder, the interests of those who promote them. Altruism may not be non-existent among politicians debating electoral systems and electoral reforms, but neither is it widespread.
Because of this non-neutrality, electoral and party legislation reveals interesting information about politicians' predilections. This is especially the case where electoral and party legislation is frequently revised. Where it is long-standing, one might argue that electoral legislation reflects conceptions about parties, politics, and society at the time the legislation was approved, but that it no longer necessarily does so. In these cases, it might be argued that politicians accommodate themselves to electoral legislation more than they shape it. But in Brazil and other countries where electoral legislation has undergone major changes or where a new constitution has precipitated debates about electoral legislation, electoral systems register the ongoing predilections of politicians.
Even though the profoundly anti-party implications of this electoral system have been do not control the catch-all parties. Moreover, it is common for progressives to neglect the organization building that clientelistic politicians have mastered. This is a case where individuality rationality-protecting minority spaces within the party by accepting the extremely loose organization and anti-party electoral legislation-has blocked the emergence of more desirable collective alternatives.
Finally, even though politicians enjoy broad autonomy with respect to their parties, they depend upon the state apparatus for survival and success. The importance of delivering material goods in securing re-election makes it difficult for many politicians to act with autonomy with respect to those who control the state apparatus. Their insistence upon not being tied down by a political party is a reaction against this dependence on the state apparatus. This reaction has a compelling logic to it: holders of executive office often dominate political parties. In a system in which political competition involves access to state favors as much as disputes among leaders with different ideological proposals, party discipline could easily imply loyalty to a cacique more than to ideas.
Conclusion
The constitutional congress of 1987-88 afforded an opportunity to revise some of the historical obstacles to party consolidation and to attempt to create a more modern, fluid political system. In this sense, the new constitution is a disappointment. In the name of combatting authoritarianism, the political class adopted a thoroughly permissive electoral legislation that will surely lead to a highly fragmented party system. The anti-party components of electoral legislation have been reinforced. The complex and difficult combination of presidentialism, a multiparty system, and federalism has been consecrated. What may be the world's most disproportional system of proportional representation was made even more disproportional; the system overrepresents the backward parts of the country and underrepresents the modern parts. 45 With respect to political structures, the constitutional process made apparent the reluctance of a majority of political elites to effect even minor changes. None of this makes impossible the consolidation of effective parties or of democracy, but it does make it more difficult. Meanwhile, the enormous political, social, and economic costs of a political system in which representative institutions remain underdeveloped continue to increase.
Although this paper has focused on barriers to the emergence of parties that more effectively represent civil society, some changes in the society and the political system are propitious to party development and could, in the medium run, prevail over the negative aspects.
Some of the factors that could encourage the creation of a more modern political system with reasonably effective representative institutions are already present in the party system itself.
While it is possible to use state resources to control party conventions, it is more difficult to control the electorate in general, especially in urban areas and in southern Brazil, which have a notable tradition of voting against those in power. Parties that challenge the "parties of the state" are almost certain to grow. Among the parties of civil society that have strong growth potential are the PT, PSDB, PL, and PDT.
The current lethargy in civil society should not be confused with the traditional weakness of the same. Urbanization, industrialization, and new collective associations and movements have markedly changed the character of civil society. Significant parts of the labor movement and the industrial bourgeoisie are calling for a new model of development and of doing politics. These actors are demanding a modernization of the political system and a new kind of party.
Finally, in the 1980s, the huge Brazilian state has become increasingly crisis-plagued and inefficient, an obvious fetter to modernization. This crisis of the state may prompt efforts to modernize the political system and thereby help strengthen parties that represent civil society. If a modernization of the state takes place, it will undercut parties of the state, whose existence is predicated upon the balkanization and privatization of the bureaucracy. Whether this modernization will occur is not certain, but one of the indispensable steps toward it has been taken by the constitutional congress, namely, the granting of greater fiscal autonomy to state and local governments.
The auspicious factors that favor party development leave us with a country in which political institutions remain archaic, but in which some powerful political actors are convinced of the need for political modernization. It is difficult to predict whether the archaic elements or the forces for change will prevail, although the balance for the 1980s is largely negative. What is clear is that the stakes are high. If the parties of the state prevail, Brazilian democracy will fail, Brazil's egregious inequalities will go untouched, and the Brazilian economy will continue to falter. If more effective parties emerge, they will not guarantee the success of Brazilian democracy, but they are clearly a necessary ingredient. 
End Notes
8
Most analysts of Latin American parties have restricted their focus to the first two issues. I also attach considerable importance to the third, which involves consideration of party organization and internal processes.
9
My distinction between "parties of the state" and "parties of civil society" bears some parallel to the dichotomy Simon Schwartzman established between cooptation and representation. See his "Representação e Cooptação no Brasil," Dados 7 (1970): 9-41. "Parties of the state" should not be confused with parties that have statist practices or programs. I am using the concept to refer to parties that are to a considerable extent created by the state apparatus, are controlled by the state, and whose continuing existence depends on the use of state resources to secure support in civil society. Parties of the state do have linkages to civil society, but they tend to be constructed through clientelistic mechanisms rather than through representation of organized groups. Parties of the state have been a fundamental pillar in a pervasively elitist political system. 
